Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.: Moving Towards a More Flexible Approach to the Classification of Unpaid Interns Under the Fair Labor Standards Act by Pardoe, Michael
Maryland Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 4 Article 8
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.: Moving
Towards a More Flexible Approach to the
Classification of Unpaid Interns Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act
Michael Pardoe
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
75 Md. L. Rev. 1159 (2016)
  
1159 
GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC.: MOVING 
TOWARDS A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF UNPAID INTERNS UNDER 
 THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
MICHAEL PARDOE∗ 
Internships have become an integral component of the modern hiring 
process in the United States.1  Between 1981 and 1991, the amount of 
college graduates who participated in an internship during their time in 
school rose from three percent to thirty-three percent.2  Recent numbers 
from a 2015 survey of college graduates indicate that this number has risen 
to around sixty percent of college students.3  What could have caused this 
massive spike in internships?  The short answer to this question is that 
modern internships are increasingly being used as a major hiring tool for 
both students and employers.4  College students who participate in an 
internship or co-op are much more likely to receive job offers right out of 
college than those who do not.5  Unfortunately, no internship is created 
equal.  While some indeed pay quite well, around forty percent of 
internships in the United States are reportedly unpaid.6  Many view unpaid 
internships as problematic, however, based on a belief that interns should be 
considered to be “employees” owed minimum wages under the Fair Labor 
Standard Act (“FLSA”).  A number of current and former unpaid interns 
                                                          
© 2016 Michael Pardoe. 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank his editors, Skylar Ludwick, Natalie Bilbrough, Michael Cianfichi, and 
Laura Merkey, and professor Marley Weiss for their thoughtful insight throughout the writing 
process of this Note.  The author would also like to dedicate this Note to his parents, John and 
Deborah Pardoe, and his sister, Katherine, for all of their love and support.   
 1.  See infra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 2.  David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
215, 217 (2002) (quoting Dawn Gilbertson, Glamorous Internships with a Catch: There’s No Pay, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/19/business/earning-it-glamorous-
internships-with-a-catch-there-s-no-pay.html?pagewanted=all). 
 3.  NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. AND EMP’RS, THE CLASS OF 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 
(2015), https://www.naceweb.org/uploadedFiles/Content/static-assets/downloads/executive-
summary/2015-student-survey-executive-summary.pdf [hereinafter 2015 EXEC. SUMM.] (pointing 
out that 65.4% of students participated in an internship or co-op prior to graduating from college). 
 4.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 5.  2015 EXEC. SUMM., supra note 3, at 5 (noting that 56.6% of students with internships 
received job offers directly out of college, while only 36.5% of students without internships in 
college received job offers by graduation).  
 6.  2015 EXEC. SUMM., supra note 3, at 5. 
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argue that they are due wages as employees under the FLSA.7  The 
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) has failed to 
provide a formal agency rule dealing with interns and the FLSA, leading to 
a circuit split regarding the appropriate test to use to determine whether an 
intern should be considered an employee for FLSA minimum wage 
provisions.8  Needless to say, the increasingly contentious nature of this 
debate necessitates a universal framework for analyzing unpaid interns 
under the FLSA.  Unpaid interns must not be exploited, and employers 
should understand what constitutes a permissible unpaid internship 
scenario. 
In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.,9 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a modified version of the “primary 
beneficiary” test as the proper inquiry in ascertaining whether an intern is to 
be considered an “employee” for the purposes of the FLSA.10  The Second 
Circuit concluded that the WHD’s proposed (yet informal) six-factor, all-or-
nothing analysis was far too rigid to properly weigh the diverse set of 
interests involved in each unique internship.11  In doing so, the Second 
Circuit properly eschewed the strict “immediate benefit” factor in the 
WHD’s test.12  The Second Circuit also correctly added three additional 
factors to the test, which allow for flexibility in analyzing the unique 
educational aspects of the modern internship.13  However, while a flexible 
analysis is certainly a step in the right direction, the Second Circuit took a 
step backwards by amending their decision to suggest that courts could 
choose to analyze internship programs as a whole, rather than on an 
individualized basis.14  Furthermore, two of the factors that the Second 
Circuit incorporated into their “primary beneficiary” test from the WHD’s 
suggested test create problems under a totality of the circumstances 
framework.15  So although the Second Circuit created an excellent 
framework focusing on the individualized nature of each inquiry, the 
eventual standard must address these problematic features of the proposed 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part I (describing previous unpaid interns’ FLSA claims against their 
employer). 
 8.  See WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP 
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1 (2010),  
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf  [hereinafter Fact Sheet #1]; see also infra 
Part II. D.  
 9.  811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 10.  See infra Part III.  
 11.  See infra Part III.  
 12.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 13.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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analysis to ensure that interns are not improperly exploited by their 
employers.16 
I.  THE CASE 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. involves claims asserted by 
three individuals who served as unpaid interns for Fox Searchlight in New 
York.17  Plaintiffs Eric Glatt and Alexander Footman both worked as 
interns for Fox Searchlight’s movie Black Swan in New York, while the 
third plaintiff, Eden Antalik, was an intern at Fox Searchlight’s corporate 
office.18 
Eric Glatt interned for the Black Swan film while pursuing his 
graduate degree at New York University’s School of Education.19  Glatt 
worked Monday to Friday from nine a.m. until seven p.m. for around three 
months.20  Among other duties, Glatt scanned documents, tracked purchase 
orders, and maintained employee files.21  After completing this internship, 
Glatt took a second internship with the post-production crew.22  Here, Glatt 
completed paperwork, ran errands, and drafted brief cover letters.23  This 
second internship lasted five months; however, Glatt only worked about 
two days a week, from eleven a.m. to  seven p.m.24 
Alexander Footman also interned for the movie Black Swan, working 
for about five months in the production department.25  Footman worked ten-
hour days, although he shifted from working five days a week down to 
three days a week at or about two months into the internship.26  Footman’s 
responsibilities included setting up office furniture, coordinating lunches, 
answering phones, photocopying, and making various deliveries.27  
Footman was not enrolled in a graduate program, as he had already 
graduated with a degree in film studies from Wesleyan University.28 
                                                          
 16.  See infra Part IV.C; infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 17.  811 F.3d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 18.  Id. at 532–33. 
 19.  Id. at 532.  Glatt’s graduate program, however, did not offer him credit for participating 
in the internship.  Id.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  Additionally, Glatt managed and transported paperwork to various departments.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  Footman also took out trash, welcomed and admitted guests into the office, compiled 
lists of “local vendors,” and drafted call sheets for daily use.  Id.  
 28.  Id.   
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Finally, Eden Antalik worked as an unpaid “publicity intern” in Fox 
Searchlight’s New York corporate office.29  For three and a half months, 
Antalik came to work at eight a.m. and assembled briefs for Fox 
Searchlight.30  Additionally, Antalik made travel arrangements, coordinated 
catering, and shipped documents.31  She was enrolled in a program at 
Duquesne University that required an internship to graduate; however, 
Antalik never actually received the credit.32 
The three individuals filed a class action complaint seeking minimum 
wage for the hours worked at these internships according to standards 
promulgated under the FLSA and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).33  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
agreed with the plaintiffs and held that the interns had been “improperly 
classified as unpaid interns.”34  Additionally, the district court granted 
Antalik’s motions to certify a class of New York interns within Fox 
Searchlight.35  The district court also conditionally granted Antalik’s 
motion to certify a collective class of nationwide FLSA interns.36  The 
defendants, Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., timely appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.37   
The Second Circuit considered the issue of “under what circumstances 
an unpaid intern must be deemed an ‘employee’ under the FLSA and 
therefore compensated for his work?”38  In its holding, the Second Circuit 
rejected the district court’s adoption of the WHD’s proposed analysis, 
opting instead to develop its own factor test that purportedly analyzes 
whether the intern or the employer receives the “primary benefit” from the 
alleged employer-employee relationship.39  Instead of the WHD’s all-or-
nothing standard, the Second Circuit felt that a flexible approach more 
adequately captures the economic realities of each individual internship.40 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 532–33. 
 30.  Id. at 533.  The briefs are referred to as “the breaks.”  Id.  These “breaks” summarize 
media mentions of various Fox Searchlight Films throughout the media that day.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  The court did not expand on why the internship did not qualify under Duquesne’s 
internship requirement.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  While the claim began as a class action, all but Antalik abandoned the class claims 
and proceeded as individuals.  Id.  Antalik proceeded with attempts to certify both a class of New 
York interns working at Fox, as well as a national FLSA collective.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  Thus, the district court granted their motion for summary judgment.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.   
 39.  Id. at 533–38 (“Instead, we agree . . . that the proper question is whether the intern or the 
employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.”).  
 40.  See id. at 536 (holding that the new test allows for a better look into the “economic 
reality” of the intern’s employment situation).  
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the term “employee” in 
federal labor law contexts for decades.41  Part II.A of this Note will 
introduce Congress’s purpose behind enacting the FLSA.42  Part II.B will 
discuss two early Supreme Court decisions, decided prior to the FLSA, in 
order to contextualize the most prominent factors that the Supreme Court 
addresses in making “employee” determinations within the context of 
federal labor statutes generally.43  Part II.C will introduce Walling v. 
Portland Terminal,44 the seminal case that heavily influcenced the WHD’s 
suggested six-factor intern-employee test.45  Finally, Part II.D will illustrate 
the WHD’s proposed six-factor analysis, as well as the circuit split 
regarding whether the WHD’s informal Opinion Letter is the appropriate 
framework for FLSA employee determinations.46  While some circuits 
provide a marginal amount of deference to the WHD’s proposed six-factor 
test, others have rejected the test altogether in favor of what they view as a 
more “flexible” approach in the “primary beneficiary” test.47  No court, 
however, has adopted the WHD test in full.48 
A.  Congress’s Purpose in Enacting the FLSA 
In order to fully appreciate the intern-employee debate facing the 
Second Circuit in Glatt, it is important to first recognize Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the FLSA.  Congress codified the purpose of the FLSA 
in 29 U.S.C. Section 202(a).49  Section 202(a) notes that labor conditions 
that are detrimental to the “maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers” have 
the potential to create devastating effects on the economy and individual 
wellbeing.50  Congress worried that these detrimental conditions fostered 
unfair competition that could proliferate across industries.51  This unfair 
competition would lead to significant labor disputes and interfere with the 
fair marketing of goods in commerce.52  President Roosevelt signed the Act 
                                                          
 41.  See generally infra Part II.  
 42.  See infra Part II.A.  
 43.  See infra Part II.B.  
 44.  330 U.S. 148 (1947).  
 45.  See infra Part II.C. 
 46.  See infra Part II.D.  
 47.  See infra Part II.D. 
 48.  See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“[W]hile some circuits have given some deference to the [WHD] test, no circuit has adopted it 
wholesale . . . .”); see also infra Part II.D. 
 49.  29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
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in 1937 in order to provide “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”53  This 
focus on eliminating the improper exploitation of labor is the central issue 
fueling the debate regarding the proper framework for making employee 
determinations under the FLSA.54 
In enacting the FLSA, Congress created the Wage and Hour Division 
within the Department of Labor to administer the Act in accordance with 
these goals.55  The WHD’s role in administering the FLSA is important to 
keep in mind, as it is the WHD’s informal interpretation of the appropriate 
framework for analyzing intern-employer relationships that the Second 
Circuit expressly rejects in Glatt.56 
B.  Early Non-FLSA “Employee” Determinations Helped to Frame the 
Relevant Inquiries in Determining Employment Status Under the 
FLSA 
 In order to understand the reasoning behind the WHD’s proposed six-
factor test, it is important to first introduce the early Supreme Court cases 
that formed the basis for the WHD’s informal suggestions.57  Although the 
FLSA was signed into law in 1937,58 there was scant debate surrounding 
the definition of the term “employee” until around 1947.59  A few cases, 
however, which predate the FLSA, frame the scope of the “employee” 
analysis within the context of federal labor statutes generally.   
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications,60 the Supreme Court considered 
whether newspaper boys were “employees” for the purposes of the National 
Labor Relations Act.61  The Supreme Court held that the scope of the term 
“employee” was “to be determined not exclusively by reference to 
common-law standards, local law, or legal classifications made for other 
purposes, but with regard also to the history, context and purposes of the 
Act and to the economic facts of the particular relationship.”62  In finding 
that the newspaper boys were employees, the Court took into account a 
number of considerations, including the regularity of the individuals’ work, 
                                                          
 53.  81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Franklin Roosevelt); S. REP. No. 884-
2475, at 2 (1937). 
 54.  See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 527 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(describing the exploitation of labor as one of the “evils” that the FLSA targets). 
 55.  29 U.S.C. § 202(a).  
 56.  See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We 
decline DOL’s invitation to defer to the test laid out in the Intern Fact Sheet.”).   
 57.  See infra Part II.B–C.  
 58.  Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers, 38 VT. L. REV. 
555, 557 (2014).  
 59.  Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148 (1947).  
 60.  322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 61.  Id. at 120. 
 62.  Id. at 111.  
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the workers’ reliance on those earnings for primary support, the hours of 
work supervised, and the sales equipment provided by Hearst to the 
paperboys for Hearst’s benefit.63   
In United States v. Silk,64 the Supreme Court considered whether a 
particular group of coal workers should be classified as employees under 
the Social Security Act.  The Court focused on the degree of control over 
the workers, the skill required to perform the job, and the permanency of 
the relationship in holding that the workers were employees under the 
Act.65  Both of the holdings in Hearst and Silk are important because 
similar factors came into play once the Supreme Court was faced with its 
first FLSA employee determination.66 
C.  Portland Terminal and the Supreme Court’s Staunch Approach to 
the FLSA 
While the above cases illustrate some of the early approaches to an 
“employee” determination under federal labor statutes, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.67 is used as a baseline in 
making “employee” determinations under the FLSA within the 
intern/trainee context.68  The plaintiffs in Portland Terminal were trainees 
working for the defendant’s railroad company.69  This seven or eight day 
training program was a prerequisite to employment with the company.70  
The trainees would shadow regular employees until they were gradually 
permitted to take on further responsibilities.71  However, even if the training 
program was successfully completed, there was no guarantee of a job at the 
conclusion of the program.72  These training programs were unpaid until 
1943.73  Even after this date, the trainees continued to receive well below 
the minimum wage.74 
The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the trainees 
should be considered “employees” under the FLSA.75  If the individuals 
were deemed employees, the railroad company would be compelled to pay 
                                                          
 63.  Id. at 131.  
 64.  331 U.S. 704 (1947).  
 65.  Id. at 716. 
 66.  See infra Part II.C. 
 67.  330 U.S. 148 (1947).   
 68.  Id.  Many FLSA “employee” analyses will open with a discussion of this key decision 
from 1947.  See infra Part II.D.  
 69.  Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 149. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 150.  
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 149.  
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minimum wages for the time spent in the training program.76  The FLSA, 
however, provides little clarity in this area.  The FLSA defines an 
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”77  This vague 
definition is obfuscated further by the Act’s definition of “employ” as “to 
suffer or to permit to work.”78  Faced with such ambiguity, the Court 
stressed that although the Act was meant to cover those who “contemplated 
compensation,” the definition of “employ” was clearly not intended to 
“stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied 
compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the 
premises of another.”79 
In their analysis, the Court first noted that the training provided was 
similar to what one might pay for in a vocational school course.80  The mere 
fact that the program created a labor pool, and not guaranteed employees, 
was not necessarily dispositive, especially considering the free learning 
experience provided to the trainees.81  Most importantly, however, the 
Court noted that the railroad received no “immediate advantage” from these 
trainees.82  The fact that the trainees required employee supervision, the 
Court found, would actually impede the regular employees’ work.83  
Additionally, no regular workers were displaced by the trainee program.84  
The totality of the circumstances of this employment situation led the Court 
to hold that the trainees were not employees.85  A hasty concurrence from 
Justice Frankfurter, however, warned that such a narrow conception of the 
issue “put[s] industry and labor in a legal strait jacket of our own design.”86  
Justice Frankfurter worried that the majority’s rigid approach may have 
negative implications moving forward.87 
The Court’s decision in Portland Terminal was extremely influential 
because the WHD’s suggested FSLA employee analysis in the trainee 
context is based directly upon the factors considered by the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 76.  Id.  
 77.  29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012). 
 78.  29 U.S.C. § 203(g).  
 79.  Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152.  
 80.  See id. at 152–53 (“Had these trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or private 
vocational school . . . it could not reasonably be suggested that they were employees of the school 
within the meaning of the [FLSA].”). 
 81.  See id. at 153 (noting that the FLSA was not enacted to penalize employers who provided 
free instructional experience).  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 149–50. 
 85.  Id. at 150.  
 86.  Id. at 154 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 87.  Id. at 155 (“This Court has foreclosed every means by which any claim, however 
dubious . . . can safely or finally be settled, except by litigation to final judgment.”).  
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in Portland Terminal.88  The informal nature of this proposed test, coupled 
with the rigid framework suggested by the WHD, has led to a circuit split as 
to the proper analytical structure to use when determining the employment 
status of both interns and trainees under the FLSA.89 
D.  The Modern Circuit Split on the WHD’s Suggested FLSA 
“Employee” Analysis 
Since Walling v. Portland Terminal, courts have had trouble deciding 
the appropriate test to apply to intern and trainee employee determinations 
under the FLSA.  The WHD first issued informal guidelines, in the form of 
a six-factor test, to provide a framework for determining a trainee’s 
employee status under the FLSA.90  Because these scenarios are so similar 
to unpaid internships, however, the WHD would often use this same six-
factor test in issuing opinion letters on internships.91  To avoid ambiguity, 
the WHD eventually issued an informal opinion letter in 2006, which 
essentially recycled the six-factor trainee analysis to formulate a test dealing 
directly with internships.92  Again deriving their interpretation from the 
relevant factors considered by the Court in Portland Terminal, the WHD’s 
informal opinion letter (“Opinion Letter”) urges that if all six factors are 
met, an employment relationship does not exist.93 According to the WHD’s 
informal Opinion Letter, an intern is not an employee if all six of the 
following factors apply: 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be 
given in an educational environment;  
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;  
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works 
under close supervision of existing staff;  
                                                          
 88.  Gregory S. Bergman, Unpaid Internships: A Tale of Legal Dissonance, 11 RUTGERS J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 551, 569 (2014) (noting that the factors accompanying the WHD’s suggested test 
are derived from Portland Terminal). 
 89.  See infra Part II.D. 
 90.  See McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Following Portland 
Terminal the Wage and Hour Division . . . promulgated a six-part test to guide its determination of 
whether trainees are in fact employees.”).  
 91.  See Wage & Hour Op. Ltr. No. FLSA2004-5NA (Dep’t of Labor May 17, 2004), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2004/2004_05_17_05FLSA_NA_internship.htm 
(applying the six-factor trainee framework to analyze a student internship inquiry and noting that 
the WHD “has consistently applied this test in response to questions about the employment status 
of student interns”).  Thus, while many of the cases in Part II of this Note will involve claims by 
trainees, the analysis will be analogous in the internship context because the WHD’s proposed 
tests for the two categories are essentially the same.  See infra Part II.D.1–2. 
 92.  See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8. 
 93.  See id.; see also, e.g., Bergman, supra note 88, at 569 (noting that the factors 
accompanying the WHD’s suggested test are derived from Portland Terminal).  
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4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its 
operations may actually be impeded;  
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion 
of the internship; and  
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.94 
The WHD urges an all or nothing, not a totality of the circumstances, 
approach to this inquiry.95  However, because the Opinion Letter is not an 
official agency regulation, courts disagree about whether to adopt the test at 
all,96 and this disagreement has led to a circuit split.97  Regardless of the 
chosen analysis, the common theme between most of the circuits’ decisions 
shows a clear indication that courts wish to have some flexibility in this 
area of the law, as opposed to a rigid approach advocated for by the WHD’s 
proposed analysis.98 
1.  In Rejecting the WHD’s Strict Approach, Many Circuits Have 
Instituted Their Own Versions of a “Primary Beneficiary” 
Analysis in Place of the WHD’s Test 
Many circuits have rejected following the WHD’s proposed approach, 
opting instead to institute their own balancing analysis to determine who 
primarily benefitted from the supposed employment relationship.99  For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit outlined 
its approach to FLSA employee determinations in Solis v. Laurelbrook 
Sanitarium & School, Inc.100  In Solis, the WHD decided to pursue potential 
child labor law violations at a boarding school.101  The school taught 
“practical training” to the students, requiring four hours every school day 
for students to learn various real world skills such as working in a 
cafeteria.102  Some of the programs were approved for credit, while others 
were left up to the discretion of the transferee school.103  No wages were 
earned in this endeavor, and the students were not promised jobs after 
                                                          
 94.  See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8. 
 95.  See id. (“[I]f all of the following six factors are met, an employment relationship does not 
exist.”).  
 96.  See infra Part II.D. 
 97.  See infra Part II.D.  
 98.  See infra Part II.D. 
 99.  See infra Part II.D. 
 100.  642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).  
 101.  Id. at 519.  
 102.  See id. at 520 (noting that students’ duties in this regard included working in the cafeteria 
and the sanitarium).  
 103.  Id. at 521. 
 2016] GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC. 1169 
graduation.104  The parties disagreed as to whether the WHD six-factor 
analysis should apply.105  The Sixth Circuit declined to give deference to 
the WHD’s proposed strict approach to the inquiry.106  Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit relied on Rutherford to hold that the totality of the circumstances 
must be used instead.107 
Similar to the Glatt decision, the Sixth Circuit in Solis used a “primary 
beneficiary” type analysis to review the employment relationship.108  The 
court’s test focused on the “benefits flowing to each party.”109  In doing so, 
“[f]actors such as whether the relationship displaces paid employees and 
whether there is educational value derived from the relationship are relevant 
considerations that can guide the inquiry.”110  The court ultimately held that 
the students received the greater benefit from the relationship based on the 
fact that the workers spent extra time supervising the students, and because 
the students received a practical learning experience that made them the 
“primary beneficiaries” of the relationship.111 
In a recent September 2015 decision, Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 
P.A.,112 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided 
to follow the Second and Sixth Circuits in applying the “primary 
beneficiary” test to inquiries regarding externships in graduate programs.113  
This case is especially significant, considering that the Eleventh Circuit 
adopted the Glatt court’s formulation of the “primary beneficiary” test.”114  
In Schumann, the plaintiffs were enrolled in a masters degree program 
working to become Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (“CRNAS”).115  
Florida law requires CRNAS to complete a clinical portion of education as 
                                                          
 104.  Id.  
 105.  See id. (describing that while the district court applied a version of the “primary 
beneficiary” test, the Department of Labor Secretary, who originally brought the claim against the 
defendants, heavily advocated for the court to use the WHD six-factor analysis).  
 106.  See id. at 525 (holding that an all-or-nothing approach is inconsistent with the flexible 
approach that Congress intended the FLSA to allow).  
 107.  Id. (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 332 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).  
 108.  See id. at 525–26 (pointing out the rigidity of DOL’s suggested strict adherence to the 
six-factor WHD test, and noting that an all-or-nothing approach is inconsistent with the flexible 
approach that Congress intended in passing the FLSA).  
 109.  Id. at 529. 
 110.  Id.   
 111.  Id. at 530–32.  Additionally, the parents testified that they believed the program greatly 
benefitted their children who were enrolled by providing hands-on experiential learning.  Id.  The 
Sixth Circuit took this into account it its balancing of the benefits flowing to either party.  Id. 
 112.  803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 113.  See generally Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1209–14 (rejecting the WHD’s Opinion Letter and 
holding that the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Glatt represents the appropriate framework for 
making intern-employee determinations under the FLSA). 
 114.  See id.  
 115.  Id. at 1202.  
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a graduation requirement.116  This clinical component of the CNRA 
curriculum often required students to work forty-plus hour weeks, readying 
rooms, stocking carts, and preparing pre-operation forms (often without 
supervision, even though they had daily evaluations).117  The students 
argued that this made them employees under the FLSA.118  The students 
claimed that their autonomy on the job, as well as the amount of hours 
worked per week, displaced the work with which regular employees would 
otherwise be tasked.119 
The Eleventh Circuit declined to follow the WHD’s six-factor test, 
holding that these factors amounted to an unnecessarily rigid reduction of 
the facts of Portland Terminal.120  In moving forward with a “primary 
beneficiary” approach, the court specifically adopted the factors set forth by 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.121  The Schumann court expressed 
skepticism that the entirety of the claim would fall in favor of the 
employer.122  The Eleventh Circuit thus remanded the case for further 
proceedings, and explained that it could be the case that a portion of the 
students’ work was properly unpaid, while another portion could qualify the 
students as employees.123 
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of the WHD’s proposed 
analysis arrived merely two years after it provided some deference to the 
WHD’s  Opinion Letter.  In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,124 
the plaintiffs were students in MedVance’s billing and coding program.125  
In order to graduate, the students were required to complete an externship at 
Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., for which they did not expect or receive 
pay.126  The program allegedly lacked formal structure, was repetitive, and 
provided the students with “little educational benefit,” as opposed to the 
economic benefit that Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc. allegedly received 
                                                          
 116.  Id. at 1203.  
 117.  Id. at 1203–06. 
 118.  Id. at 1204. 
 119.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 120.  See id. at 1209 (noting that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 
being an agency, is in no better of a position to interpret the holding of Portland Terminal than a 
court would be).  
 121.  See id. at 1209–13 (“Only Portland Terminal’s reference to the railroad’s receipt of ‘no 
immediate advantage’ from any work done by the trainees is not accounted for by the Glatt 
factors.”).  
 122.  See id. at 1213 (noting that it would be unclear why Collier would be willing to take so 
many long-term interns if they did not derive an immediate benefit from them, and therefore, the 
factor is inappropriate).  
 123.  Id. at 1214–15. 
 124.  504 F. App’x 831, 832 (11th Cir. 2013).  
 125.  Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 832. 
 126.  Id. at 832–34.  
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from the students’ work.127  In holding that the students were not 
employees, the Eleventh Circuit favorably cited the WHD’s proposed test, 
and held that the appropriate analysis required an inquiry into who received 
the “immediate benefit” in the employment relationship.128  The court 
focused on a few educational factors to  hold that the defendant did not 
receive an immediate benefit because the necessary supervision of the 
students in the programs actually hindered productivity.129  Finally, the 
students knew that this work would not entitle them to a job.130 
In McLaughlin v. Ensley,131  the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit also declined to follow the WHD’s informal opinion, opting 
instead to develop a version of the “primary beneficiary” analysis.132  In 
McLaughlin, the plaintiffs were required to participate in an unpaid 
weeklong orientation period in order to work as snack food truck 
salesmen.133  The orientation, which required about fifty to sixty hours of 
work, was organized so that trainees would travel ordinary routes with 
experienced salesmen.134  While there was purportedly no guaranteed job 
offer at the conclusion of this period, all who successfully completed the 
training in the past were in fact offered jobs.135  The Fourth Circuit first 
acknowledged that the starting point for determining the appropriate 
analysis is Portland Terminal.136  However the majority quickly rejected the 
WHD six-factor test and opted instead to follow existing Fourth Circuit 
precedent.137  The Fourth Circuit held that the proper test looks to who 
principally (or primarily) benefits from the employment arrangement.138  
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 833. 
 128.  Id. at 834. 
 129.  Id. at 835.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).  
 132.  Id. at 1209. 
 133.  Id. at 1208.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1209. 
 137.  Id.  The applicable precedent refers to Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1964).  
In Wirtz, an employer hired two high school teenagers at his insurance company to work nearly 
forty-three hour work weeks below minimum wage.  Id. at 786.  The Fourth Circuit found an 
important factor in the FLSA “employee” determination to be grounded in whether the students 
were engaged in commerce and also took a look at who benefitted from the labor.  Id. at 787–88.  
The Fourth Circuit found that just because he taught the students skills did not mean that they 
were not employees based on their involvement with interstate company marketing and sales 
mailings.  Id.  Thus, the defendant was the real beneficiary, and to hold otherwise, the Fourth 
Circuit noted, “would violate the letter and the spirit of the Act.”  Id. at 788.   
 138.  McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209.  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit drew support for this 
interpretation of the appropriate test from its decision in Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Serv., Inc., 450 
F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971).  In Isaacson, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[T]he rationale of Portland 
Terminal would seem to be that the railroads received no ‘immediate advantage’ from the 
 1172 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1159 
Because the training program in McLaughlin specifically displaced regular 
workers, and because the skills learned were narrowly tailored to the niche 
“snack-food” industry, the Fourth Circuit decided that the employer 
principally benefitted from the relationship.139  Thus, the workers were to 
be considered employees under the FLSA, and were entitled to wages.140 
2.  Some Circuits Have Instituted a Totality of the Circumstances 
Type Framework as Opposed to the WHD’s Suggested All-or-
Nothing Approach 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Reich v. 
Parker Fire Protection District,141 was faced with an “employee” 
determination under the FLSA after potential fire department employees 
filed a claim against their alleged employers.142  The potential fire fighters, 
with no pay, underwent a ten-week training program.143  Although a job 
was all but guaranteed upon completion, training was a necessary 
prerequisite to permanent employment.144  The program involved classroom 
learning, as well as the maintenance and operation of the department’s 
equipment.145  Instead of following the WHD’s rigid adherence to the 
factors, the Tenth Circuit decided that a totality of the circumstances 
approach of the proposed factors was more appropriate for these types of 
inquires.146  The Court held that the individuals were not employees, 
because the training was akin to a vocational school’s training program, the 
maintenance of the equipment was supervised, which hampered regular 
employee productivity, and the trainees’ presence never removed the need 
for qualified firefighters at the department.147 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not 
expressly rejected the WHD’s proposed factors; however, the circuit has 
                                                          
trainees’ services . . . the principal purpose . . . was to benefit the person in the employee status.”  
Id. at 1309.  
 139.  McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1210.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 142.  Id. at 1025. 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  See id. (“Defendant required attendance at its academy not only to ensure that its 
firefighters knew basic fire science and defendant’s standard operating procedures, but also to 
build a sense of teamwork and cooperation among the incoming firefighters.”). 
 145.  See id. (noting that the maintenance of the equipment involved groups of trainees who 
staffed a truck that had been attended to by volunteers (the individuals whom the trainees were to 
replace after the training program was instituted) and keeping the truck stocked and ready).   
 146.  See id. at 1026–27 (“Moreover, there is nothing in Portland Terminal to support an ‘all or 
nothing’ approach.”).  Additionally, the court used Skidmore to hold that the unofficial agency 
suggestions should not be followed, because an all-or-nothing position is inconsistent with 
previous WHD interpretations.  Id.   
 147.  Id. at 1027–29.  
 2016] GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC. 1173 
taken a more flexible approach to the inquiry.  In Donovan v. American 
Airlines, Inc.,148 the court was faced with such a determination in the 
context of flight attendant trainees selected by the defendant airline 
company.149  After being selected, American Airlines required individuals 
to quit their job to complete a five-week, forty hour-a-week training 
program.150  There was no guaranteed offer of employment at the 
conclusion of the training period.151  The trainees, however, did not 
supplement or replace regular employee work.152  After referencing 
Portland Terminal, the Fifth Circuit declined to limit the inquiry to whether 
an individual works solely for his or her own benefit, noting that if this was 
the case, then the American Airlines program would be nothing more than 
an altruistic “pro bono” program of no use to the company at all.153  The 
court ultimately decided to weigh both sides’ benefits, holding that the 
program was a legitimate step towards preparing employees for the job, and 
the sacrifice made by the individuals was simply a necessary hurdle to 
employment.154  The Fifth Circuit concluded their decision by referencing 
the WHD six-factor test and its derivation from Portland Terminal.155  In 
citing the WHD’s Opinion Letter, which suggests that “if all six of the 
criteria are met, no employment relationship exists,” the court found that 
the trainees did not satisfy any of these criteria and thus reaffirmed their 
holding on these grounds.156 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the Second Circuit 
overturned the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs 
on the issue of whether Glatt and Footman had been improperly classified 
as interns.157  The court also overturned Antalik’s motions for class 
certification with regards to the New York interns, as well as the district 
court’s conditional certification of the FLSA collective.158  All three of the 
                                                          
 148.  686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 149.  Id. at 268. 
 150.  Id. at 269.  
 151.  Id. at 268. 
 152.  Id. at 269. 
 153.  See id. at 272. 
 154.  See id. (“Trainees make a sacrifice . . . , [b]ut so do all who seek to learn a trade or 
profession.  Centralized training is to American’s advantage, but the airline has no duty to offer 
training at an inconvenient place.”).  
 155.  See id. (classifying the six-factor test as the “Wage and Hour Administrator’s 
interpretation of Portland Terminal”).  
 156.  See id. at 273 (“The trainees here are not employees by each of those criteria . . . .”).  
 157.  811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 158.  See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.  
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claims were remanded for further proceedings under the new “primary 
beneficiary” test formulated by the Second Circuit.159 
The Second Circuit first addressed the district court’s determination 
that Glatt and Footman had been improperly classified as interns during 
their time working for Fox Searchlight Pictures on the movie Black 
Swan.160  The Second Circuit noted the ambiguity in this area, as no 
Supreme Court case had ever definitively addressed the issue of interns 
with regards to the FLSA.161  In addition, the Second Circuit recognized 
that the district court had used the WHD’s proposed six-factor analysis in 
order to determine the interns’ employment status.162  The district court 
found that four of the conditions were met by the plaintiffs; however, the 
final two could not be met.163  While the WHD’s informal suggestions 
urged a strict adherence to the six-factor test, the district court took a 
totality of the circumstances approach in holding that Glatt and Footman 
were employees.164  The WHD also appeared in this case as amicus curiae 
in support of the plaintiffs and their proposed factor test.165  Nevertheless, 
the Second Circuit declined to follow the WHD’s suggested six-factor 
analysis derived from Portland Terminal, noting that “an agency has no 
special competence or role in interpreting a judicial decision.”166  The 
Second Circuit also declined to adopt the informal WHD test because, as 
they held, the WHD’s all-or-nothing approach boils down to a “rigid” 
distillation of the particular circumstances in Portland Terminal.167 
Instead of a rigid approach, the Second Circuit decided that a flexible 
test was more appropriate in light of the nature of the modern internship.168  
Thus, the court adopted the “primary beneficiary” test, which first considers 
                                                          
 159.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 538.  
 160.  See generally id. at 533–38 (discussing the issue of whether the interns should be 
considered employees under the FLSA).  
 161.  See id. at 534 (noting that while the Supreme Court decided a 1947 case denying trainees 
wages under the FLSA, the case does not readily apply to modern internship positions 
(referencing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947))).  
 162.  Id. at 535.  The WHD factors include whether the internship is similar to actual work 
done by employees, whether the internship is for the “benefit of the intern,” whether the intern 
displaces regular employees with his work, whether the employer receives an “immediate 
advantage” from the intern’s contribution, whether the intern is to be offered a job upon 
completion of the internship, and whether both the employer and the intern understand that the 
intern is not to be working for a wage.  See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8.  
 163.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 535.  
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See id. at 536 (quoting New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1997)).  
 167.  See id. (noting that this approach is desirable because it focuses on what the intern will 
receive from the company for his contributions, as well as the flexibility to consider the 
“economic reality” between interns and employers). 
 168.  See id. at 537 (“This approach we adopt also reflects a central feature of the modern 
internship—the relationship between the internship and the intern’s formal education . . . .”).   
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as a salient feature “what the intern receives in exchange for his work.”169  
The second salient feature of the overall analysis allows for “flexibility to 
examine the ‘economic reality’ of the relationship as it exists between the 
intern and the employer.”170  In order to determine the “economic reality” 
of an internship in particular, the Second Circuit promulgated its own set of 
seven factors to consider when applying the “primary beneficiary” test.171  
The non-exhaustive list of relevant factors include: 
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly 
understand that there is no expectation of compensation.  Any 
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the 
intern is an employee—and vice versa. 
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would 
be similar to that which would be given in an educational 
environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training 
provided by educational institutions. 
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal 
education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of 
academic credit. 
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s 
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic 
calendar. 
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the 
period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial 
learning. 
6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than 
displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant 
educational benefits to the intern. 
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand 
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job 
at the conclusion of the internship.172 
The Second Circuit felt that this approach adopted flexible guidelines 
for courts to follow, while continuing to remain true to the Supreme Court’s 
guidelines set forth in Portland Terminal.173  In determining the “economic 
reality” of the employment relationship, the Second Circuit reiterated that 
no one factor is meant to be dispositive, nor is the list meant to be 
exhaustive.174  Additionally, the court felt that the test’s focus on the 
educational aspects of the internship represented the proper inquiry with 
                                                          
 169.  Id. at 536. 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id. at 536–37. 
 172.  Id. at 537. 
 173.  See id. (reiterating that the new test better reflects the role of formal education in modern 
internships).   
 174.  Id.  
 1176 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1159 
regard to interns.175  The Second Circuit then remanded for further 
proceedings based on their new test.176 
On January 25, 2016, the Second Circuit amended its July decision, 
presumably to clarify the focus of the “primary beneficiary” test, by 
including a few additional considerations.177  While the court reaffirmed 
their adoption of the “primary beneficiary” test, along with the seven-factor 
test, the Second Circuit added a third salient feature to the analysis, which: 
[A]cknowledges that the intern-employer relationship should not 
be analyzed in the same manner as the standard employer-
employee relationship because the intern enters into the 
relationship with the educational or vocational benefits that are 
not necessarily expected with all forms of employment (though 
such benefits may be a product of experience on the job).178 
The court also noted that because the “economic reality” of the 
employment relationship is the “touchstone” of the analysis, courts may 
elect “in certain cases, including cases that can proceed as collective 
actions, to consider evidence about an internship program as a whole rather 
than the experience of a specific intern.”179  The final amendment explicitly 
states that the “primary beneficiary” test applies only to intern, and not 
trainee, employment situations under the FLSA.180 
In the original July 2015 opinion, the Second Circuit also addressed 
both of Antalik’s class certification claims.181  Beginning with the motion to 
certify the New York class of interns in a number of Fox’s divisions, the 
Second Circuit struck down the district court’s grant of certification to the 
group on the basis that the “primary beneficiary” test is highly 
individualized and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.182  Because 
relevant factors in the new “primary beneficiary” test include the 
educational benefit derived, the type of training received, and the extent of 
the time spent at the internship, the Second Circuit felt it would be 
impossible to adjudicate these claims under the FLSA and the NYLL in a 
class-action lawsuit.183  Turning to the conditional certification of the 
nationwide FLSA collective, the Second Circuit utilized largely the same 
arguments to determine that those in the collective are also not similarly 
                                                          
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 538. 
 177.  Id. at 536–37. 
 178.  Id. at 536. 
 179.  Id. at 537. 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. at 538–40. 
 182.  See id. at 538–39. 
 183.  Id.   
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situated, and thus may not be adjudicated in the form of a collective class 
action.184 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated the district court’s reliance on 
the WHD’s suggested six-factor test in favor of a more flexible “primary 
beneficiary” test.185  While the Second Circuit’s adoption of their own 
factors for the “primary beneficiary” test is not perfect, it is a step in the 
right direction in an area of law riddled with confusion.  The Second 
Circuit’s proposed analysis eschews the dated WHD “immediate benefit” 
factor from FLSA intern “employee” determinations, a factor that fails to 
capture the economic reality of a modern intern-employer relationship.186  
At the same time, the Second Circuit also added three important factors to 
their “primary beneficiary” test, which properly focus on benefits flowing 
both to and from interns and employers.187  The recent amendments to the 
opinion, however, could significantly narrow the flexibility allowed for in 
these three new factors.188  Additionally, while the Second Circuit fixed a 
number of problems with the WHD’s suggested analysis, the court 
improperly included two of the WHD’s proposed factors into their “primary 
beneficiary” test.189  These factors become problematic both under a 
flexible approach, as well as when viewed in light of the intimate 
relationship between internships and future job prospects in today’s job 
market.190  The eventual standard should adopt this educationally focused 
“primary beneficiary” approach, absent these problematic WHD factors that 
made their way into the Second Circuit’s analysis.191 
A.  The Glatt Court Properly Dismissed the WHD’s Requirement That 
an Employer May Not Receive an “Immediate Benefit” from the 
Work Performed by an Intern 
The Second Circuit was correct in rejecting the WHD’s requirement 
that interns not provide an “immediate benefit” to employers.  The Second 
Circuit’s omission of this consideration represents an understanding that 
both employers and interns should be permitted to benefit from an 
                                                          
 184.  See generally id. at 539–40 (noting that a nationwide collective does not contain similarly 
situated class members because it involves a “wider range of experience”).  
 185.  See supra Part III. 
 186.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 187.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 188.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 189.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 190.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 191.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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internship, regardless of pay, provided that the experience is mutually 
beneficial to both parties.  The fourth WHD factor queries whether the 
employer obtains some “immediate benefit” or advantage from the 
employment relationship.192  This factor is directly derived from Portland 
Terminal.193 The WHD’s proposed six-factor test recommends that interns 
perform “no or minimal work” in order to satisfy the no “immediate 
benefit” portion of their proposed analysis.194  While this requirement may 
have been a relevant factor in trainee or independent contractor FLSA 
employee determinations, requiring interns to refrain from providing an 
“immediate advantage” to an employer effectively destroys the modern 
conception of internships as effective hiring tools.195 
According to a National Association of Colleges and Employers 
(“NACE”) survey of recent college graduates, a majority of internships 
today require interns to perform “core business functions” in one form or 
another.196  Furthermore, many feel that internships provide a mutual 
benefit to both parties.197  While the student is given the opportunity to 
receive real world experience, the employer may receive some immediate 
benefits from the work product and also use the program as a hiring tool.198  
This beneficial give-and-take characteristic of many modern internships 
                                                          
 192.  See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8. 
 193.  See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947) (“[Because] the 
railroads receive[d] no ‘immediate advantage’ from any work done by the trainees, we hold that 
they are not employees within the Act’s meaning.”).  
 194.  See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8 (“[If] the intern performs no or minimal work, the 
activity is more likely to be viewed as a bona fide education experience.”).  
 195.  See infra notes 196–216 and accompanying text. 
 196.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. AND EMP’RS, 2010 INTERNSHIP & CO-OP SURVEY 1 (May 
2010), http://www.kstate.edu/ces/conference/documents/ResearchBrief_2010Internship_Co-
opsummary.pdf (“Interns and co-ops spend the lion’s share of their time engaged in core business 
functions.  On average, less than 3 percent of their time is spent on nonessential functions.”); see 
also Sarah Braun, The Obama “Crackdown:” Another Failed Attempt to Regulate the 
Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 295 (2012) (“The WHD’s 
recommendation, however, that interns perform ‘no or minimal work’ is entirely antithetical to the 
experiential value inherent in the internship process.”); Deborah C. Brown, Internships and the 
FLSA, 88 FLA. B.J. 53, 56 (2014) (pointing out that the “primary beneficiary” test has been 
advocated by the “American Council on Education and other college-affiliated industry groups as 
part of its amicus brief to the Second Circuit in Glatt”).  
 197.  See Braun, supra note 196, at 296 (noting that if internships provide no benefit at all to 
employers, employers have “absolutely no incentive” to offer internships to students); Jaclyn 
Gessner, How Railroad Brakemen Derailed Unpaid Interns: The Need for a Revised Framework 
to Determine FLSA Coverage for Unpaid Interns, 48 IND. L. REV. 1053, 1067 (2015) (“Employers 
find value in new hires with work experience . . . .  One study reported that some employers ‘will 
not consider a candidate for employment who has not completed an internship.’”). 
 198.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. AND EMP’RS, 2010 INTERNSHIP & CO-OP SURVEY 1 (May 
2010), http://www.kstate.edu/ces/conference/documents/ResearchBrief_2010Internship_Co-
opsummary.pdf (“Among respondents, the primary focuses of their programs is to feed their full-
time hiring program: Approximately 83 percent of respondents cited this as the primary focus of 
their internship program.”). 
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could be destroyed if an intern is prohibited from providing any immediate 
benefit to the employer.  Some argue that a rigid approach properly protects 
interns;199  however, a rigid analysis may actually destroy these core 
educational components that make modern internships so valuable.200  
While the  Department of Labor (“DOL”) has remained steadfast in urging 
the strict application of their six-factor analysis, courts have chipped away 
for years at the notion that such determinations should be made under an 
unwaveringly rigid analysis.201 
With this in mind, and considering the massive rise in the amount of 
internships participated in every year, it makes little sense to impose a 
blanket restriction barring any “immediate advantage” flowing to the 
employer.202  Between 1981 and 1991 the number of students participating 
in internships throughout college rose from one in thirty-six to one in three; 
“recent figures set it at two in three or higher.”203  Sixty-five percent of 
graduating seniors in 2015 participated in an internship or co-op during 
their time in school.204  Even though 40% of college students participated in 
unpaid internships, only 6.2% of all interns reported dissatisfaction with 
their experience.205  Additionally, while 56.5% of students who participated 
in an internship received at least one job offer, only 36.5% of those with no 
internship experience received offers.206  These numbers indicate that 
obtaining an internship, regardless of pay, provides a more successful path 
to employment than not doing so. 
The DOL’s antiquated six-factor analysis, derived from a 1940s 
Supreme Court decision dealing with railroad trainees, could not have 
                                                          
 199.  See Jessica L. Curiale, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1558 (2010) (“If the 
WHD does not promulgate a rule clearly mandating that the six-factor test be applied in an all-or-
nothing manner to determine whether an intern is an employee, courts may continue to find 
unpaid internships legal under various other tests . . . .”). 
 200.  See Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that “[there is] nothing in Portland Terminal to support an ‘all or nothing’ approach,” and 
opting instead to view the employment situation under a totality of the circumstances approach); 
Jaclyn Gessner, supra note 197, at 1068 (“While wages offer instantaneous economic relief, the 
long-term gains from a quality job experience offer more valuable benefits.”). 
 201.  See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“[W]hile some circuits have given some deference to the [WHD] test, no circuit has adopted it 
wholesale . . . .”).  
 202.  See Gessner, supra note 197, at 1056 (“Intern hiring has increased by 2.9, 6.8, 8.5, and 
2.7% each year since 2010.”).  
 203.  David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
215, 217 (2002) (quoting Dawn Gilbertson, Glamorous Internships With a Catch: There’s No 
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, § 3, at 16).  
 204.  2015 EXEC. SUMM., supra note 3, at 5. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
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anticipated this role of internships in today’s society.207  Interns should not 
be discouraged from providing value to the entity for which they are 
interning; a hands-on learning experience is much more desirable than 
relegating unpaid experiences to “shadowing” or passively participating in 
the experience.208  Furthermore, it is unlikely that companies would bother 
running long-term internship programs requiring any degree of supervision 
if they never received any benefits themselves.209  Accordingly, interns and 
employers share a mutual interest in eliminating the immediate-benefit bar 
on intern-employer relationships. 
The Second Circuit in Glatt recognized this inherent inconsistency in 
the “immediate benefit” factor, eliminating it from the factors 
accompanying their “primary beneficiary” test.210  While the plaintiffs 
urged the court to analyze the relationship under the “immediate benefit” 
factor, the Second Circuit felt that a more modern analysis would allow 
courts additional flexibility in ascertaining the economic realities as they 
exist between interns and employers.211 
Many other decisions that incorporate the immediate benefit factor end 
up failing to capture the true nature of the relationship, further reinforcing 
the Second Circuit’s decision to eliminate it from their “primary 
beneficiary” test.212  Consider the Eleventh Circuit’s scrutiny in Kaplan v. 
Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., where the court noted, “when a person 
works for his own advantage or personal purpose—particularly when his 
work provides no ‘immediate advantage’ for his alleged ‘employer’—he is 
not an ‘employee’ under the FLSA.”213  The Eleventh Circuit held that 
students in an externship at a medical billing company did not provide an 
“immediate advantage” to their employer.214  To cabin the discussion in this 
manner, however, completely ignores the value of the students’ work to the 
employer.  There is good reason to believe that if Code Blue consistently 
                                                          
 207.  Braun, supra note 196, at 293 (“At present, so many internships are likely in violation of 
the law because they simply cannot satisfy a standard that dates back more than sixty years.”). 
 208.  See Joseph E. Aoun, Protect Unpaid Internships, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13, 2010),  
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/07/13/aoun (noting that shadowing represents “a 
pale imitation of true experiential learning”).  
 209.  See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
find it difficult to conceive that anesthesiology practices would be willing to take on the risks, 
costs, and detriments of teaching students . . . without receiving some benefit for their troubles.”). 
 210.  See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
[WHD six-factor] test is too rigid for our precedent to withstand.”).  
 211.  See id. at 537–38 (“This approach we adopt also reflects a central feature of the modern 
internship—the relationship between the internship and the intern’s formal education.”).  
 212.  See Gessner, supra note 197, at 1065 (“The current legal test makes it nearly impossible 
for an employer to offer a legal, unpaid internship, because it fails to recognize the many benefits 
the internship offers.  A more flexible test that recognizes the benefits offered by internships is 
needed to resolve this problem.”).   
 213.  504 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2013).  
 214.  Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 835.  
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allowed externs to complete their clinical requirement at the company, year 
after year, then the students must have provided some immediate benefits to 
justify the training and supervision costs.215  Thus, a more flexible 
balancing test would allow courts to properly weigh these benefits flowing 
to and from either side.216 
B.  The Second Circuit Correctly Added Educationally Focused 
Factors to the Analysis, However, the Court Erred in Suggesting 
that Internship Programs Should be Reviewed as a Whole 
A focus on the educational nature of each internship will better allow 
courts to ascertain the true economic reality of the unique employment 
situation of each internship.  Some commentators express concerns over the 
Second Circuit’s decision to vacate the interns’ victory in order to employ a 
flexible approach, worrying that a flexible approach provides significant 
advantages to employers in FLSA “employee” determinations.217  However, 
the Second Circuit’s proposed factors accompanying their “primary 
beneficiary” test include three additional modern educational considerations 
into the “primary beneficiary” test.218  These added considerations are 
important add-ons; the factors appear to emphasize the need for an 
individualized review of the circumstances underlying each intern-employer 
relationship.219  The “individualized” nature of the added factors are also 
what makes the Second Circuit’s January 2016 amendments to the decision 
                                                          
 215.   See Braun, supra note 196, at 295 (“While . . . the internship experience is for the benefit 
of the intern . . . it is a bit of a stretch to expect a company to provide an internship and receive 
absolutely no benefit whatsoever in return.”).  
 216.  See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Applying 
these considerations requires weighing and balancing all of the circumstances.”); Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (hypothesizing that the 
“primary beneficiary” test will tease out the benefits to each party in accordance with the flexible 
approach required by the FLSA); Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 
1993) (recognizing that employee determinations under the FLSA in other contexts are not subject 
to rigid tests, but under a totality of the circumstances approach). 
 217.  See Rebecca M. Lopez, Second Circuit Establishes ‘Primary Beneficiary’ Test to 
Determine Whether Interns Are Employees Covered by the FLSA,  NAT’L L. REV. (July 8, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/second-circuit-establishes-primary-beneficiary-test-to-
determine-whether-interns-are (“Although Glatt represents a victory for employers, for-profit 
employers must still be cautious when engaging unpaid interns and structuring their workplace 
duties.”); see also Noel P. Tripp, Second Circuit Holds ‘Primary Beneficiary’ Test Is Standard to 
Determine Employee Status of Unpaid Interns; Likely Dooms Any Unpaid Intern Class and 
Collective Actions, NAT’L L. REV. (July 2, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/second-
circuit-holds-primary-beneficiary-test-standard-to-determine-employee-
status#sthash.HrmonJZ0.dpuf. (“Employers obtained a clear victory in these cases . . . .”).  
 218.  See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 539 (laying out the new seven factors accompanying the “primary 
beneficiary” test and noting that they reflect the need for a “highly context-specific” and 
educationally focused inquiry); see also supra Part III (discussing the new factors formulated by 
the Second Circuit to accompany the “primary beneficiary” test).  
 219.  See id. at 537 (“Applying these factors requires weighing and balancing of all the 
circumstances.”).  
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so perplexing.220  The amendments suggest that an internship program 
should be viewed as a whole, and not on an individualized basis, effectively 
nullifying the benefits of a “flexible” inquiry. 
It is first worth noting that a number of the factors introduced by the 
Glatt court are undoubtedly derived from the WHD’s proposed six-factor 
analysis.221  This is important because, as will be explained later, two of the 
borrowed factors become part of the problem with the Second Circuit’s new 
test.222  The borrowed factors include whether the intern clearly expects to 
be compensated, whether the intern’s work complements or displaces 
regular employees, the extent to which the training received is akin to that 
which would be given in an educational environment, and the extent to 
which interns understand that they are not necessarily entitled to a paid 
position at the conclusion of the experience.223  However, the Glatt court 
goes further and adds three more factors specifically designed with an 
educational focus in mind.224 
1.  The Educationally Focused Factors Properly Complement a 
Flexible “Primary Beneficiary” Framework 
The first of the new factors asks whether the experience is tied to the 
intern’s “formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt 
of academic credit.”225  This factor properly reflects the reality of many 
internships in today’s society, because offering credit for unpaid internships 
may sometimes be the only way that certain companies, government 
organizations, or government agencies can afford to provide internship 
experiences at all.226  Many colleges provide accompanying credit or 
coursework so that the student may earn credit for the work performed at 
their internships.227  Courts should take this into consideration, because 
precluding unpaid internships that otherwise comply with credit or 
                                                          
 220.  See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text (discussing the recent amendments to 
the Glatt decision).  
 221.  See infra notes 222–223 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 223.  Compare Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537 (listing out the seven factors for the “primary 
beneficiary” test to be scrutinized according to the totality of the circumstances), with FACT 
SHEET #71, supra note 8 (proposing an all-or-nothing six-factor analysis to be used in FLSA 
“employee” determinations within the internship context).  
 224.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537  Factors three, four, and five of the seven factors proposed by the 
Second Circuit to accompany the “primary beneficiary” test are geared towards an individual, 
educationally focused analysis.  Id. 
 225.  Id.  
 226.  See Gessner, supra note 197, at 1069–70 (pointing out that if unpaid internships are 
completely disallowed by the FLSA, many employers may be precluded from providing 
internships altogether). 
 227.  See Braun, supra note 196, at 298 (noting that colleges have added a credit component to 
many unpaid internships in an attempt to “legitimize” them to the DOL). 
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coursework requirements would reduce the number of otherwise valuable 
internship programs simply because the internships are unpaid.228  
Additionally, suggesting that courts examine the link between college 
credits provided and the internship experience will encourage colleges to 
continue offering a wider variety of internships—internships that might not 
be available as a result of the chilling effect of a more rigid analysis under 
the WHD’s proposed factors.229  At the same time, a flexible factor test 
allows courts the leeway to analyze internships held by non-students 
because courts will be permitted to disregard formal education factors and 
focus on other factors.230  For example, if a non-student internship is being 
scrutinized, a court may nonetheless focus on the second factor, which asks 
the extent to which the internship provides similar training to that which 
would be given in an educational setting.231  Thus, a court could still 
analyze an unpaid internship held by a non-student in an effective manner.  
This scenario speaks to the one of the many benefits of a flexible analysis. 
The second new Glatt factor looks at the extent to which the internship 
“accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to 
the academic calendar.”232  This too will assist courts in discerning 
educationally beneficial unpaid internships versus exploitative ones, 
because the factor suggests that questions should arise whenever the link 
between the academic component and the internship experience becomes 
tenuous.233  This consideration will likely encourage courts to analyze the 
unique educational aspects of each internship in order to determine whether 
it is a bona fide experience tied to credit received at school, or an 
exploitative internship. 
                                                          
 228.  See Aoun, supra note 208 (“However, just the threat of increased regulation could have a 
chilling effect on the willingness of employers to offer internships—paid or unpaid.”); see also 
Joseph Aoun et. al., Letter from University Presidents to Department of Labor, CHRONICLE (Apr. 
28, 2010), 
https://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/FINAL_US%20Department%20of%20Labor%20letter.pdf 
(“The Department’s enforcement actions and public statements could significantly erode 
employers’ willingness to provide valuable and sought-after opportunities for American college 
students.”).  
 229.  See Braun, supra note 196, at 304 (suggesting that colleges could require employers to 
provide comprehensive descriptions of the internship experiences, and they could monitor the 
internships throughout in order to ensure that they remain focused and educationally stimulating); 
see also Aoun, supra note 208 (describing the chilling effect of threatening unpaid internships if 
such internships are subjected to the DOL’s rigid analysis). 
 230.  See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537 (laying out the seven-factor analysis accompanying the 
primary beneficiary analysis). 
 231.  Id.  
 232.  Id.  
 233.  See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“[W]here the clinical training and the academic commitment are one and the same, this 
consideration must account for whether a legitimate reason exists for clinical training to occur on 
days when school is out of session.”).  
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The final new factor introduced by the Second Circuit into their 
“primary beneficiary” test analyzes “the extent to which the internship’s 
duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern 
with beneficial learning.”234  This factor implies that internships must be 
cabined within a reasonable time frame so as to maximize the educational 
experience, while minimizing the risk of employer exploitation of 
interns.235  The recent Eleventh Circuit decision adopting the “primary 
beneficiary” test, Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., helps to clarify this 
prong of the analysis.236  In adopting the Second Circuit’s approach, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that courts must sometimes focus on “whether the 
duration of the internship is grossly excessive in comparison to the period 
of beneficial learning.”237  As some commentators note, this means that the 
court will look to see whether the internship runs longer than “absolutely 
necessary” to accomplish the intended experiential goals.238  This approach 
is desirable because it takes into account the nuances involved in each 
unique internship experience.  Did the intern spend six weeks learning and 
using valuable skills, and then the next six weeks learning nothing new?  If 
so, it could mean that the employer improperly exploited the unpaid intern 
during those last six weeks.  However, while these added factors allow for a 
great deal of flexibility, the Second Circuit’s recent amendments to the 
decision open a back door that could allow courts and employers to 
circumvent the flexible components of the analysis entirely.239 
2.  The Second Circuit Narrowed the Flexibility of Its “Primary 
Beneficiary” Test by Suggesting That Internships Should Be 
Viewed as a Whole, Not on an Individualized Basis 
While the new factors promulgated by the Second Circuit appear to 
advocate for an individualized inquiry into intern-employer relationships, 
its recent January 25, 2016, amendments to the original opinion suggest 
otherwise.240 Among other amendments, the Second Circuit added that 
courts may choose to “consider evidence about an internship program as a 
                                                          
 234.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537. 
 235.  Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1213–14 (noting that while designing internships is not an “exact 
science,” the duration of the internship should comport with the “goals of the internship”).  
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id.  
 238.  See Brian S. Cousins et al., Eleventh Circuit Adopts and Clarifies “Primary Beneficiary” 
Test for Unpaid Interns Under the FLSA, DENTONS (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2015/september/30/eleventh-circuit-adopts-and-
clarifies-primary-beneficiary-test-for-unpaid-interns-under-the-flsa (“The [Schumann] court 
therefore rejected a quantitative approach . . . adopting instead a qualitative approach of looking at 
the nature of the intern’s daily schedule.”).  
 239.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537.  
 240.  See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.  
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whole rather than the experience of a specific intern” in analyzing the 
“economic realities” of the employment relationship.241  These recent 
amendments obfuscate the primary virtue of the “primary beneficiary” test 
by placing unreasonable constraints on what was an otherwise flexible 
inquiry. 
By permitting courts to disregard individualized aspects of each 
internship and allowing for a review of internship programs “as a whole,” 
the Second Circuit has created an avenue for courts to effectively disregard 
the “economic reality” of an intern-employer relationship.242   In Glatt, for 
example, one of the plaintiffs had already graduated from school; he 
participated in the internship on his own accord.243   The other plaintiff was 
a current graduate student.244   Both performed different functions as 
interns, and both were in vastly different educational situations.245  To allow 
courts to disregard the educational experiences of each individual intern 
would mean that a court could completely disregard the new, educationally 
focused factors promulgated above.246  In fact, this is what the Second 
Circuit seems to suggest.247  In their final textual amendment, the Second 
Circuit explains that the purpose of internships is to tie in coursework with 
real world “skill development.”248  However, the court adds, “unlike the 
brakemen . . . in Portland Terminal, all of the plaintiffs were enrolled in or 
had recently completed a formal course of post-secondary education.”249   
This view grossly oversimplifies the new educational components of 
the Second Circuit’s own proposed factor test.  Why introduce factors 
urging courts to examine the link between the internship and credits or 
coursework, or the “extent to which the internship . . . [corresponds] to the 
academic calendar,” when these distinctions can be simply disregarded in 
favor of a generalized view of the internship as a whole?250  By allowing 
courts to circumvent the very framework touted as “flexible,” the Second 
Circuit has made it easier for employers to satisfy the “primary beneficiary” 
                                                          
 241.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537. 
 242.  Id.  
 243.  Id. at 532–33. 
 244.  Id. at 532. 
 245.  See id. at 532–33 (describing the tasks assigned to each plaintiff during their internships 
at Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.). 
 246.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 247.  Practical Law Labor & Employment, Second Circuit Amends Fox Searchlight Decision 
on Unpaid Internships, WESTLAW (Feb. 1, 2016), http://us.practicallaw.com/w-001-3948 (noting 
that the amendments differ from the July 2015 decision by holding that the “primary beneficiary” 
analysis “focuses on the internship program as a whole, rather than each individual intern’s 
experience”).  
 248.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537.   
 249.  Id. at 537–38. 
 250.  Id. at 537 (laying out the proposed factors accompanying the “primary beneficiary” test).  
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framework, even if the program is noncompliant.251  While the Second 
Circuit continues to praises its test for its flexibility, the recent amendments 
raise significant doubts as to the test’s true flexibility in its practical 
application.252 
C.  The Second Circuit’s Adoption of Two Factors from the Wage and 
Hour Division’s Six-Factor Analysis Also Becomes Problematic 
Under a Flexible, Totality of the Circumstances Approach 
The Second Circuit’s conception of the “primary beneficiary” analysis 
also creates worries regarding the boundaries to set for a flexible view of 
the FLSA, an Act once said to apply broadly to set “minimum standards in 
the workplace in order to eliminate unfair competition both among 
employers and also among workers looking for jobs.”253  The Second 
Circuit also recognized the problems associated with such a flexible test, 
noting that, “although the flexibility of the “primary beneficiary” test is 
primarily a virtue, this virtue is not unalloyed.”254  Thus, the Glatt court 
decided to implement a few of the WHD’s proposed factors accompanying 
the “primary beneficiary” test in order to properly cabin the discussion 
within the educational context.255  However, two of the repurposed factors 
from the WHD’s rigid conception of the appropriate test regarding 
expectations of compensation and entitlement to a job create problems 
under the Second Circuit’s flexible “primary beneficiary” analysis. 
The first suspect factor that the Second Circuit borrowed from the 
WHD test asks whether the intern and employer clearly understand that 
there is no expectation of compensation.256  While this consideration seems 
intuitive when viewed under the WHD’s all-or-nothing analysis, it becomes 
inherently problematic when placed within a totality of the circumstances 
analysis.  Under a totality of the circumstances framework, one could 
conceive of a scenario where an intern reasonably expected payment, and 
                                                          
 251.  Robert S. Whitman et al., Second Circuit Leaves Interns in the Cold—Again, MONDAQ 
(Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/461896/employee+rights+labour+relations/ 
Second+Circuit+Leaves+Interns+In+The+ColdAgain (“[These amendments] may render the 
specific experiences of a named plaintiff less important in the overall ‘primary beneficiary’ 
analysis and make it easier for an employer to satisfy the test even if a particular manager did not 
administer a compliant program.”).  
 252.  See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536 (praising the “primary beneficiary” test for its “flexibility to 
examine the economic reality as it exists between the intern and the employer”). 
 253.  Curiale, supra note 199, at 1556.  
 254.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536.   
 255.  See id. at 537 (stressing that the “central feature” of the modern internship is the 
“relationship between the internship and the intern’s formal education”).  
 256.  Id. at 537; FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8. 
 2016] GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC. 1187 
the court could still find that the intern was not an employee.257  The notion 
that one could accept a position expecting payment, yet still be denied 
“employee” status based on the “totality of the circumstances,” is 
problematic in light of the purposes of the FLSA laid out in Walling v. 
Portland Terminal.258  In Portland Terminal, the Supreme Court stated that 
the FLSA “was [enacted] to insure that every person whose employment 
contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his services for 
less than the prescribed minimum wage.”259  While educational 
considerations lend themselves to flexible interpretations, an expectation of 
payment should suffice as clear-cut evidence of an employment 
relationship.  There is no place for this factor within a totality of the 
circumstances framework. 
The other problematic factor adopted from the WHD’s proposed test 
by the Second Circuit essentially requires that “[t]he trainees or students 
[not be] necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training 
period.”260  This means that under the WHD test, a legitimate unpaid 
internship likely may not exist if the intern is promised any sort of job 
prospect at the conclusion of the internship.  However, as noted earlier, this 
is entirely antithetical to the modern realities of internships in our 
society.261  As the NACE 2015 Student Survey notes, between thirty-three 
and fifty percent of students in unpaid internship positions can expect offer 
rates for a full time job.262  Furthermore, the cost of hiring former interns is 
about one-third the cost of recruiting and training new hires.263  
Additionally, a survey of over 65,000 undergraduate students found that 
over half of those surveyed identified an opportunity for full-time 
employment as one of the top three things that they would like to get out of 
an internship.264  To leave this factor in place suggests that courts could 
invalidate unpaid internships based solely on their promise of a job.265  In 
reality, as long as the educational merit of the internship indicates that the 
                                                          
 257.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537 (noting that “no one factor is dispositive”).  However, under the 
WHD’s suggested test, the all-or-nothing test would compel an employment determination if the 
individual took the internship with the justified expectation of payment.  See FACT SHEET #71, 
supra note 8. 
 258.  See supra Part II.B. 
 259.  Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
 260.  Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537; FACT SHEET #71, supra note 8. 
 261.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 262.  2015 EXEC. SUMM., supra note 3, at 5.  The exact rate depends on whether the position 
was for a for-profit organization, a private organization, or a state and local government internship 
position.  Id.  
 263.  David Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 241 (1998). 
 264.  Chris van Mossevelde, The Value of Internship Programs, UNIVERSUM (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://universumglobal.com/articles/2014/01/the-value-of-internship-programs/. 
 265.  See Gessner, supra note 197, at 1076 (noting that in order for the employer to comply 
with this requirement, it seemingly “must not promise its interns future employment”).  
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intern is the primary beneficiary of the experience, potential job prospects 
should be irrelevant because they only add value to the experience.  And 
because those surveyed from unpaid internships reported a thirty to fifty 
percent job offer rate, a consideration that could wipe out potential job 
opportunities runs contrary to the FLSA’s goal to increase employment 
opportunities.266 
Considering the potentially negative implications of these two 
erroneous WHD factors in the Second Circuit’s “primary beneficiary” test, 
it would be unwise for the Supreme Court to adopt the Second Circuit’s test 
as it stands today.  However, a similar decision clarifying the scope of or 
omitting these problematic factors could be a perfect opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to clear up the immense confusion in this area of law.267  A 
Supreme Court decision is certainly not the only option; the Department of 
Labor Wage and Hour Division could promulgate formal agency 
regulations through their rulemaking authority.268  Finally, Congress could 
specifically amend the statute to include a clear standard for analyzing 
internships under the FLSA.269  Regardless of the method, a formal standard 
should be established in order to clear up confusion in this area of the 
FLSA.  While the Second Circuit took steps in the right direction, the 
addition of improper WHD factors, in addition to the confusion surrounding 
the recent amendments, means that its conception of the “primary 
beneficiary” test is not fit for adoption.  Beneath these erroneous features, 
however, lies a great framework for future courts to apply and expand. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the Second Circuit declined 
to follow the Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division’s proposed 
framework for making intern-employee determinations under the FLSA, 
electing instead to develop a more flexible “primary beneficiary” test.270  
The new test properly eschewed rigid WHD factors, such as the 
                                                          
 266.  See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151 (1947) (pointing out that one of 
the purposes of the FLSA is to “[I]ncrease opportunities for gainful employment”); see also 2015 
EXEC. SUMM., supra note 3, at 5 (“Offer rates for students in unpaid positions ranged from 33.8 
percent to 50.0 percent . . . .”).  
 267.  See Bergman, supra note 88, at 585–89 (advocating for a Supreme Court standard to 
settle the confusion on the proper FLSA intern employee inquiry). 
 268.  See Curiale, supra note 199, at 1548–59 (advocating for the WHD to utilize its formal 
rulemaking authority under the FLSA to codify a concrete standard for making intern-employee 
determinations).  
 269.  See id. at 1549 (noting that though unlikely, Congress could address the unpaid internship 
problem).  This approach is unlikely because Congress generally writes broad statutes and does 
not amend the statutes regarding very specific issues.  Id.  Furthermore, Congress specifically 
delegated power to the WHD to administer the FLSA through rules and regulations.  Id.; see also 
supra Part II.A.  
 270.  See supra Part III.  
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requirement that interns provide no immediate benefit to the employer, in 
favor of a totality of the circumstances approach to the analysis.271  The 
Second Circuit also correctly added three additional factors into their 
“primary beneficiary” test in order to shift the inquiry towards an 
educationally driven approach.272   
However, while these additions are a step in the right direction, the 
Second Circuit tainted the utility of these factors with its recent 
amendments adding limiting language to the test.273  On the other end, the 
new test also erroneously retained two factors from the WHD’s proposed 
factor test.274  These factors create the potential to allow for results that are 
inconsistent with both the FLSA, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Walling v. Portland Terminal.275  Regardless, the eventual standard in this 
area of law should be heavily based upon the underlying, educationally-
focused framework articulated by the Second Circuit prior to their 
amendments.276  This test, in its proper form, should be implemented as 
soon as possible.  Students, colleges, and employers need concrete 
standards, not informal Opinion Letters.  For better or for worse, internships 
have become a touchstone of the modern hiring process for young job-
seekers.  Considering the integral role internships play in this process, it is 
time to provide them with the legal attention that they deserve. 
 
 
                                                          
 271.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 272.  See supra Parts III, IV.B.1. 
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 274.  See supra Part IV.C.  
 275.  330 U.S. 148 (1947); see also supra Part IV.C. 
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